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Introduction
As one of the most inﬂuential philosophers of the
twentieth
century,
Ludwig
Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) has impacted a variety of scholarly
disciplines, including education theory and
research. Wittgenstein’s later works are often
cited for their insights into a wide variety of philosophical topics, including meaning and understanding, rule following, the “inner” and “outer”
realms of human activity, and certainty about
knowledge. In contrast to the representationalist
view of language expressed in his earlier work,
these writings identify the meaning of an expression as its rule-governed use in language, inextricably tied to its use in our lives.

Wittgenstein’s name has been invoked with
increasing regularity, especially since what might
be termed the “social turn” in research on learning
in (science) education, including interest in the role
of discursive interaction in human development
and in sociological studies of scientiﬁc practice.
Less understood but no less signiﬁcant in education
research are the implications of Wittgenstein’s
vision of an alternative orientation for philosophy
and, in turn, the impact of this vision on theory and
research in the various human sciences. Wittgenstein claimed that frustration with psychology
should not be mistaken for problems related to its
being an underdeveloped science. Rather, he
faulted “conceptual confusions” in which prescribed methods are thought to deliver solutions
to problems but instead miss the mark entirely.
Extending these Wittgensteinian points, philosopher Peter Winch argued that social science
is much more conceptual than empirical and that
the proper understanding of meaningful human
action involves dialectical examination of language use. Producing empirical evidence to satisfy an essentially conceptual question – for
example, concern with identifying the “most
effective instructional method” or even “what
was learned in a laboratory exercise” – results in
begging the question, regardless of the depth of
care we take in specifying operational deﬁnitions.
Most theories that get adopted in education
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research end up simply replacing the answers
given to the perpetual problems of educational
practice while leaving central analytic orientations intact; Wittgenstein’s and Winch’s notions
force us to examine whether education researchers
should instead fundamentally change the questions that are asked.

Wittgenstein’s Philosophy
Numerous summaries of Wittgenstein’s biography and philosophical contributions exist; only
broad arguments related most directly to the
uptake of his work in science education are
given here. As outlined in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1958) and other posthumously organized collections of his vast notes
and dialectical exemplars, Wittgenstein’s later
work was concerned with pointing to the
unrelieved role of grammar in philosophical puzzles. Wittgenstein proposed time and again that
philosophical difﬁculties were often the result of a
lack of clarity surrounding our concepts; certain
expressions (e.g., “to be” or “to exist”) continually
lure us into supposed philosophical crises,
whereas examining the expression’s logic in use
suggests a “therapeutic” alternative analysis and
resolution.
The analysis of the meaning of an expression
relies on examination of its ordinary use in our
lives, use that is embedded in what Wittgenstein
referred to as “language games.” A language
game is essentially a grammar of practice, rule
governed, and knowable to competent speakers
of a language. It is sometimes assumed that
philosophy’s task is to produce solutions to puzzles of meaning and existence, akin to the natural
sciences’ aim to produce causal explanations of
observed patterns and relationships. Again, however, for Wittgenstein, the goal of philosophy
properly conceived is to produce clarifying
descriptions of the rule-governed use of concepts
in our various language games.
One question raised by Wittgenstein’s philosophy concerns the source of the aforementioned
rules: is it in fact the case that the origin of these
rules is what is in need of explanation? And if it is

not the task of philosophy to produce this explanation, perhaps this is the rightful role of linguistics or social science more generally? Although
some have certainly advanced this interpretation
of Wittgenstein, a more common response is to
point to his numerous references to the commonly
perceived but sorely misguided need to secure the
foundations of all knowledge. Rather than
suggesting a skeptical interpretation of his discussions of rule following, Wittgensteinian philosophers such as Peter Hacker (1999) and Cora
Diamond (1989) urge us to understand his writings as pointing to the way that rules exist against
a background of modes of living in and talking
about the world; rules and contexts are mutually
constitutive rather than causally emergent and in
need of explanation.
Wittgenstein’s insistence on the rule-governed
nature of our lives may also be heard as validation
of scholars who insist on the primacy of social,
rather than psychological, explanations of human
behavior. It is the case that Wittgenstein discusses
and rejects the idea of a “private language” – the
notion that an individual attaches unique names to
individual experiences, and this creates an “inner
world” known only to himself (e.g., see Hacker
1999). Typically, however, Wittgenstein should
be interpreted not as “taking sides” in a familiar
battle but as resetting the terms of the debate; in
this case, it is not so much the triumph of “social”
over “individual” worlds that is noteworthy but,
rather, the way in which the “inner-outer divide”
itself can be seen as illusory and a product of our
ways of speaking rather than a conundrum in
desperate need of resolution.
Related to this critique of the mind-body
(or more contemporary brain-body) dualism,
Wittgenstein is largely seen as having dismantled
a representationalist view of language. “Representationalist” refers to the notion that language
ties to and names the world, such that its use is
indicative of something lying behind it; language
“stands for” or “points to” something, in the way
that announcing “I am hungry” is sometimes
thought to imply that the speaker is translating
introspection into words, orienting to her inner
condition in order to communicate with others.
Alternatively, stating “I am hungry” can be seen
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simply as a rule-governed behavior we engage in
(rather than, e.g., crying or enduring the pain of an
empty stomach). It is a subtle distinction to talk of
language as expressing rather than representing.
And of course, language can be used to represent,
or to name – Wittgenstein challenges us to see that
representing is but one use for language, not a
fundamental, singular, or universal relationship
between language and the world.

Influence in Science Education Research
In order to appreciate the inﬂuence of
Wittgenstein’s writings in science education
research, it is helpful to have a general outline of
studies of student learning in the ﬁeld. While
consensus on the approach to research or even
the goal of inquiry is not readily apparent, the
overwhelming focus has been on students’ understanding of scientiﬁc concepts. Conceptual learning has been and is often still thought of as the
acquisition or restructuring of individual mental
representations. Increasingly, though, language
and social interaction have been viewed as critical
in shaping these mental representations; in some
cases, the notion of concept-as-mentalrepresentation has been called into question.
Attempts to determine the causal relevance of
other factors such as motivation, attitude, elements of individual identities, learning environments, or other “internal” or “external”
characteristics have also been undertaken.
In relation to research on students’ learning in
science, Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been
invoked in at least four broad ways over the last
several decades (Heckler 2014). Early dissenters
to the emerging “conceptual change” theory of
cognitive learning in science as analogous to
rational theory replacement in the discipline of
science argued against the plausibility of novice
students’ ability to logically justify and appropriate scientiﬁcally superior counterparts to their
naïve and unworkable explanations of the world.
Wittgenstein’s writings were used to emphasize
the nonrational aspects of human interaction
(persuasion versus reason; learning by imitation
and training) or to point to multiple and local
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rationalities as more relevant to the student’s task
than a universal scientiﬁc logic.
A second strand of research has enlisted Wittgenstein in the project of theorizing student learning as a sociocultural rather than individualpsychological process. Students’ acquisition of
scientiﬁc concepts was characterized as successful participation in a scientiﬁc language game.
Most theorists argued for a picture of learning
that involved a combination of “individual” and
“social” elements, for example, appropriate language performance as evidence of a scientiﬁc
concept correctly internalized. However, occasionally Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been used
in science education to argue for rejecting the
individual-social dichotomy and any sense of a
uniquely individual cognition.
The introduction and use of the science studies
literature – broadly, sociological, historical and
philosophical inquiries into scientiﬁc practice as
it occurs in particular settings, on particular
occasions – in science education provided a third
opening for the use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
An interest in science studies grew out of the
sociocultural in research on science learning;
rather than imagine logical scientiﬁc theory
change as a cognitive development, investigators
studied science classrooms as sites of scientiﬁc
practice (and concept development), inspired by
methods and arguments from science studies. The
path to Wittgenstein here is somewhat indirect,
but emanates largely from the writings of David
Bloor, who as spokesperson for the “Edinburgh
Strong Programme” in science studies argued
(following Saul Kripke) that Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule following licensed a skeptical
interpretation: that if we can’t point to empirically
derived, natural causes for the rules we follow in
various forms of practice (including rules for language use), the explanation must lie in social
consensus, the formation of which should be studied and understood theoretically. This socialconstructivist approach to explaining how students come to understand science in classroom
settings was embraced by science education
researchers beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s.
Finally, Wittgenstein’s writings have inspired
discussion of new methodologies in researching
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students’ science learning. The most robust of
these has been known as “practical epistemology
analysis,” which involves analyzing transcripts of
science learning activities, in order to pinpoint
where students have difﬁculty understanding and
how that difﬁculty is resolved via known concepts. Wittgenstein’s notion of meanings that
“stand fast” in relation to their surroundings was
combined with the notion of “family resemblance” across language games in order to reimagine and investigate students’ acquisition of new
conceptual understanding in science. Such analysis was used to describe what students learned
from various laboratory practicals and how
student-teacher interaction guided learning, to
identify metaphors as important connectors
between students’ established knowledge, and to
illustrate students’ use of aesthetic judgments in
negotiating their participation in a school science
classroom, among others.

The Problem of Scientism
Although Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been
cited in service of studying student learning in
science in various ways, the claim has been
made that ultimately these references miss the
point of his arguments (Heckler 2014). To understand why, it is important to appreciate the undercurrents of anti-scientism (not antiscience) at
work in Wittgenstein’s writings. In this context,
“scientism” refers to the tendency to lift up scientiﬁc methodology as the preferred (if not sole)
source of certain knowledge in all human practices. Many academic disciplines beyond the natural sciences model their modes of inquiry on the
empirical methods of the natural sciences. However, we could ask whether some endeavors – for
example, aesthetics, ethics, or philosophy more
generally – need to emulate this methodology or
whether they might rightfully pursue other
approaches to generating knowledge. In part, the
answer depends on how we think about what is
real: must the concepts covered by epistemological or metaphysical questions be empirically
observable to count as “real?” Lyas (1999)
explains how Peter Winch draws from

Wittgenstein in examining just these questions,
asking, for example, should empirical linguistics
replace philosophy as the source of truth about our
use of concepts? Winch’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies suggest they would oppose such a conclusion for the study of much of human social life.
However, the prevalence of scientistic tendencies
across a vast swath of contemporary academic
work may suggest a lack of familiarity with the
argument – or perhaps, the common, scientistic
assumptions behind the current plethora of
“methods” and “theories” at play in the social
studies are concealed by their seeming differences
(Hutchinson et al. 2008).
Education research is not immune to these
pressures. In fact, the desirability of a scientiﬁc
approach to studies in education has been codiﬁed
by laws such as the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA) of 2015 (which recently replaced the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001). ESSA speciﬁes
that educational initiatives deserving of federal
funding for implementation and further study
must be “evidence based,” deﬁned as derived
from experimental, quasi-experimental, or correlational studies that have demonstrated a statistically signiﬁcant effect on student learning
outcomes or from rationales for approaches that
show promise of scientiﬁc validation.
This evidence-based orientation has affected
traditional norms of educational practice, as
well. For example, curriculum was once idealized
as an expression of values or of an educational
philosophy tied to its ultimate purpose: educating
for individual development, social efﬁciency,
social reform, vocational training, participation
in democratic society, social mobility, knowledge
replication and production, proof of status, transmission of cultural heritage, exposing and
transgressing oppression and injustice, and so
on. But increasingly today, curriculum is seen as
necessarily tied to “models of student learning”;
the curriculum itself must be “evidence based.” In
a ﬁeld where research traditions have been summarized as possessing “no rules that everyone
follows, no beliefs that everyone shares, no ﬁndings that everyone agrees on” (Anderson 2007,
p. 3), the assumption that research should set

Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research

curricular policy might reasonably be called into
question.
Wittgenstein spoke against the analytic tendency to reduce our human understanding of the
world to universal concepts and causal
relationships – what he called a “craving for generality.” But the overwhelming imperative in contemporary education research is indeed to satisfy
such a craving. To suggest otherwise invites
charges ranging from naiveté to professional
incompetence. With occasional exceptions, the
use of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in science education has not been to call for an alternative analytical
orientation but, rather, to appropriate singular concepts or notions in service of the familiar ways of
seeking to provide explanation for students’ learning (or lack thereof) in educational settings. “Language games,” “standing fast,” “family
resemblance,” and other Wittgensteinian notions
have been used to provide new ways of characterizing students’ learning in science, when what is
needed instead is an inquiry into whether it makes
sense to investigate learning as a process or a causal
phenomenon in the ﬁrst place.

Wittgensteinian Alternatives
for Educational Inquiry
Peter Winch, in drawing upon and extending
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in his book, The Idea
of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy
(Winch 1990), argued that the study of people is
more akin to philosophical than to natural scientiﬁc inquiry. One way to summarize it might be
this: philosophy (e.g., epistemology) is fundamentally concerned with the nature of human
social life but not empirically so. Empirical
study (in Winch’s sense) reveals something new
about the world and in particular about (causal)
relationships between objects. But philosophy’s
interest is in conceptual truths – or how our concepts are related to the world – and typically, this
is not new information but information that any
competent user of a language knows and can
recognize (Lyas 1999). Philosophers remind us
of the various ways that concepts are used meaningfully in our lives (Diamond 1989).
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To say that the study of social life is more often
conceptual than empirical is to assert that such
study takes interest in meaningful behavior, and
following Wittgenstein, meaningful behavior is
rule-governed behavior, dependent on occasion
and purpose. We expose and uncover social concepts and relationships by examining what we
know about our rule-governed forms of life.
Empirical investigation, on the other hand,
depends on settling the criteria of what is to be
observed.
When
social
concepts
are
operationalized in order to perform experimental
investigations of them, we can give the illusion of
discovering new information or of exposing
causal generalizations. But the act of operationalizing concepts in order to observe human interaction often masks myriad ways that rules are
meaningfully followed and the choices people
have in social life. Empirical analysis ends up
begging philosophical questions about the
occasion- and purpose-bound use of concepts in
our lives (Hutchinson et al. 2008).
What might conceptual analysis look like in
education research? One example is given in
Francis (2005); this critique of radical and social
constructivism relies on insights from both Wittgenstein and Winch, as well as analysis of the
logic inherent in von Glasersfeld’s “radical constructivism” and Bloor’s “social constructivism”
to illustrate the nonsensical elements of these
research agendas. Francis observes that both theories are essentially philosophical arguments
purporting to be empirical research programs.
Similar critiques might be undertaken of the various theoretical traditions existing in science education research today.
A different approach, no less informed by Wittgensteinian philosophy, guides Macbeth’s (2000)
analysis of a recorded interview between a young
student and a conceptual change researcher.
Rather than using the analysis to suggest new
theoretical understandings of science learning,
Macbeth essentially exposes the logic of alternate
“language games” at play during the interaction
and foregrounds the way in which the professional
analytic practice of a “diagnostic interview” both
relies on and simultaneously disavows the student’s everyday orientation to questions and
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answers in order to ascribe to her various levels of
conceptual (mis)understanding.
The difﬁculty of resisting the urge to theorize,
of ignoring the weight of expectations to produce
causal explanations of students’ learning, or of
eschewing the idea that social study should aspire
to anything like prediction or control of interactional outcomes should not be underestimated.
But the promise of clear and penetrating descriptions of education as rule-governed practice and
of useful insights into our understanding of meaningful behavior will perhaps ultimately inspire
ﬁdelity to Wittgensteinian perspectives in
researchers’ future analytic undertakings.
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